From the factory floor … Lockheed Martin employees work on the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter production line in Fort Worth, Texas. Defense Contract Management Agency LM Fort Worth Keystones support the vital Department of Defense mission of administering Joint Strike Fighter contracts.
The U.S. defense industrial base is increasingly vulnerable due to its dependency on materials produced in China, according to a report released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on July 24, 2024. This reliance poses significant national security risks, as all branches of the U.S. military depend on critical weapon systems that incorporate components sourced from adversarial nations.
The Department of Defense (DOD) operates through a vast network of over 200,000 suppliers for weapon systems and military equipment. While the DOD utilizes the Federal Procurement Data System to track materials and components from hostile countries, the GAO report highlights that the database offers limited information regarding the countries of origin. Additionally, federal contractors are not required to disclose the origins of all manufacturing components supplied to the DOD.
The GAO identified over 99 materials deemed in shortfall for the fiscal year 2023, none of which were manufactured in the U.S. This dependency means that many components integral to key military systems are produced by China and other nations with adversarial intentions. The report warns, “These suppliers may cut off U.S. access to critical materials or provide ‘back doors’ in their technology that serve as intelligence pathways.”
Significantly, China has demonstrated the risks associated with this dependency. In 2024, the country imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium, minerals essential for military-grade electronics. Such actions underscore the vulnerabilities that the U.S. faces in its supply chain.
The manufacturing of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter further illustrates these concerns. Production was halted after Lockheed Martin discovered prohibited Chinese magnets in the supply chain. Despite collaboration with seven allied nations, including the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, the presence of these components led to a pause in manufacturing as the DOD sought alternative suppliers.
The naval shipbuilding industry, particularly in submarine production, is similarly affected by foreign supply dependencies. Submarines require titanium casting for critical components, but the U.S. currently lacks the capacity to produce this material domestically. The GAO report states, “The U.S. has only one foundry that can produce large titanium casting required for some key weapons systems.”
While the DOD has acknowledged the risks associated with foreign dependencies, the GAO noted that no actions have been taken to implement recommended improvements. One potential solution discussed by DOD officials is to contractually require suppliers to provide detailed information about the origins of their components. Although some officials believe this information is readily available, others express concerns about potential costs and suppliers’ willingness to disclose such information.
The implications of these findings are profound, as they not only affect national security but also challenge the integrity of the U.S. defense supply chain. The findings highlight an urgent need for the DOD to enhance transparency and ensure that critical military components are not reliant on adversarial nations.
